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INTRODUCTION
Can more vigorous political competition significantly raise rural land values or contribute to more robust land rental markets? We consider this question in the context of Pakistan, where agriculture 1 contributes 21.5 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP) and more than 60 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings, while providing employment to 45 percent of the country's labor force and livelihoods to 68 percent of its rural population (Pakistan, Ministry of Finance 2013; Salam 2012) . Throughout Pakistan, land-in particular, productive agricultural land-is perceived as the single most important component of the rural household's asset portfolio, and it is closely tied with its owner's socioeconomic status (Jatileksono 1989; Renkow 1993) . A large literature examines the impact of political competition on the policy environment. This can be roughly divided into three strands. The first suggests that political competition may lead to better laws, institutions, and governance. For example, political competition can increase the transparency of policies (De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet 2012) , improve politician incentives to respond to citizens' preferences (Stasavage 2005; Callander 2008; McCourt 2012) , prevent leaders from blocking technological and institutional innovations (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) , and lead to the development of more independent judicial institutions (Hanssen 2004) . Political competition may also lead to progrowth policies such as more efficient taxation policies, greater capital spending, and adoption of labor and other market reforms (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010; Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo 2007; Rodrik 1999) .
The second suggests that political competition can lead to greater allocation of public funds to growth-and welfare-maximizing investments. For example, political competition may allow local governments to capture a greater share of resource transfers from the central government (Arulampalam and Dutta 2009 ) and thus increase spending on local development priorities. Or it may allow or even encourage local governments to improve the quantity and quality of investments in productivityenhancing publicly provided goods and services (Crost and Kambhampati 2010; Hatfield and Kosec 2013; Arvate 2013; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Ruiz-Euler 2014; Hatfield 2015) . On the other hand, political competition has the potential to reduce public-sector spending by reducing opportunities for rent seeking and corruption (Keefer and Knack 2007) .
The third examines how political competition impacts the security environment. For example, political competition can make ethnically divided societies more inclusive by reducing the ability of politicians to discriminate or favor particular groups over others-leading them to focus on a broader set of citizens (Sharif 2011) . Political competition can also boost interactions among citizens, and between citizens and their governments, reducing conflict and yielding peaceful, institutionalized mechanisms for resolving grievances (Robertson and Teitelbaum 2011) . Conversely, political competition might have the opposite effect-for example, by undermining the power of autocratic leaders or local strongmen who may be integral to security and stability in more institutionally fragile settings. For example, Baliga, Lucca, and Sjöström (2011) show that autocratic regimes support peace more than do limited democracies (though not full democracies). Gutíerrez-Romero (2014) shows that political parties may strategically instigate violence in areas where they are less likely to win-such as those with more robust political competition. And Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2014) show that an incumbent's fear of losing power may cause him or her to use election violence.
The importance of PAs has increased in recent years through several far-reaching governance reforms. A first step toward devolution occurred in 2009 when the National Finance Commission of Pakistan explicitly directed a greater share of federal resources to the provinces (particularly to Balochistan and KPK) by including measures of poverty and inverse population density in the revenue-sharing formula, and to Sindh by including taxation indicators in the formula (Shah 2012) . However, the more significant step occurred with the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 2010, which devolved 17 major federal ministries and many essential development responsibilities to the provinces. Specifically, the Eighteenth Amendment transferred a significant portion of economic and social services functions to the PA, including education, health, transfer of property, tourism, unemployment insurance, industry, agriculture and rural development, planning, welfare, and local development (Shah 2012 ; PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) 2010). 7 Much speculation suggests that the recent elections, the Eighteenth Amendment, and the orderly transition between civilian governments signal a more secure tenure for democratic, civilian rule in Pakistan. There is also speculation that the now stronger democratic processes will demand higher levels of performance and accountability from elected officials. This is particularly true for PA members who now have greater responsibility for the prioritization, financing, and delivery of publicly provided goods and services promised in their election campaigns. These new responsibilities may motivate PA members to support high-visibility investment projects-roads, irrigation canals, and energy projects-and may compel them to strengthen the delivery of public services such as health, education, drinking water, sanitation, or agricultural extension (Mani and Mukand 2007; Arif et al. 2010) . However, there is also the possibility that these new responsibilities will simply remain unfulfilled if the governance and managerial capacity of PAs is not commensurate with the electorate's expectations or the provincial development challenges.
Land Tenure and Policy in Pakistan
As Pakistan's voting base is predominantly rural, rural politics are central to Pakistani politics (Alavi 1971) . Traditionally, politics in Pakistan has been influenced by strong patron-client ties (Akramov et al. 2008; Cheema 2007; Kalshian 2011 )-particularly in rural areas where wealth, zaat (caste) , and biradiri (clan) are closely tied to land tenure. Access to land is possibly the most important measure of economic and social status in Pakistan (Qureshi, Qureshi, and Salam 2004) . Land is central to the asset portfolio of most rural households (Jatileksono 1989) .
The current pattern of land distribution in Pakistan dates back to the irrigation and settlement policies introduced during British colonial rule at the end of the 19th century (Gilmartin 2012; Ali 1988) . During this period, the British distributed land grants within canal colonies in Punjab and Sindh to rural elites in exchange for their support. The elites' claims over land were backed by property rights granted under the Punjab Alienation Act in 1900, which reinforced the segmentation between cultivator and noncultivator castes, and restricted the transfer of land between castes (Kalshian 2011) . Over time, these settlement patterns and ownership rights transformed into entrenched sociopolitical power structures that effectively partitioned the elite from the dispossessed in modern Pakistan (Cheema and Mohmand 2006) . This inequality has persisted in many parts of the country, both in terms of the prevalence of landlessness and the concentration of landholdings (Kalshian 2011; Anwar et al. 2004 ). An estimated 2 percent of the households in Pakistan control more than 45 percent of the country's land area, as shown in Appendix  Table A .1 (World Bank 2009b) . 7 While the federal government can still legislate in many of these services and sectors, its responsibilities are restricted to matters that pertain to overall national and international policy. Among other services, it is responsible for defense, immigration and citizenship, telecommunications, national highways and strategic roads, nuclear energy, and international and interprovincial trade. There are certain joint subjects such as national planning and coordination, interprovincial coordination, supervision and management of public debt, railways, and minerals that are handled by the Council of Common Interest (Shah 2012 (Qureshi, Qureshi, and Salam 2004; World Bank 2007) . Official figures also indicate that since independence, the prevalence of owner cultivation has increased in Pakistan while the prevalence of crop sharing has decreased (Cheema and Naseer 2010; Nasim and Helfand 2013) .
Rural land values in Pakistan are closely tied to productivity-related indicators such as land suitability for agriculture. This is, in turn, tied to the availability and reliability of surface and groundwater and the efficiency of administrative and socioeconomic institutions that govern water use (Aberman et al. 2013) . Efficient, market-based exchanges of land in Pakistan are constrained by the high transaction costs imposed by (1) the absence of clearly defined titles and property rights for many land parcels in the country; (2) the prevalence of customary landownership rights that are outside the purview of common law; (3) the high frequency and cost of litigation over titles and rights; and (4) limited access to credit for tenants, landless agricultural laborers, and small farmers (Qureshi, Qureshi, and Salam 2004) . Land is generally passed down between generations or sold informally according to local conventions, while formal exchanges of landownership rights are rare, apart from cases of financial distress (Renkow 1993) or largescale exchanges between landowners (Qureshi, Qureshi, and Salam 2004 ) (Appendix Table A .2).
Despite these land market frictions, the land rental market in Pakistan is active, characterized by several types of rental arrangements. Land is generally rented under one of two types of contracts: fixed rents and crop sharing (Jacoby and Mansuri 2006) . Fixed-rent arrangements are generally fixed-term contracts in which cash payment is made by the renter to the landowner. Crop sharing arrangements are not necessarily fixed-term contracts and are paid out by the tenant with a predetermined share of seasonal crop production. Crop sharing arrangements may absolve the tenant of tax obligations to the government and reduce the tenant's liability for crop losses or failure. However, the arrangement is closely associated with institutions that severely limit tenure security and other social or economic rights of the tenants (Qureshi, Qureshi, and Salam 2004) . Crop sharing arrangements are more prevalent in Sindh, where landownership is particularly concentrated, whereas in Punjab, land that is leased is evenly split between crop sharing and fixed-rent arrangements (Jacoby and Mansuri 2009 ). An estimated 79 percent of Pakistan's farm area is operated by owners while the remaining 21 percent is tenured under owner-cumtenant or tenant arrangements and either cultivated directly (that is, owned and self-operated) or rented out through crop sharing or lease arrangements (Appendix Table A.3) .
Property transactions are subject to various laws designed to govern registration, transfers, and payment of taxes on these transactions. 9 Landownership titling, demarcations, and exchanges are administered at the local level by powerful patwaris, or junior revenue officers, who serve under the land registrars of the provincial revenue boards (Ali and Nasir 2010; World Bank 2007) . In the Punjab, land can be transferred through oral expression in the presence of the patwari (USAID 2008). The process of registering a property transaction through this local administrative system requires an average of 50 days, and costs on average 5.3 percent of the total value of the property-although these figures vary by province and district, with lower average costs reported for Punjab and KPK when compared with Sindh (USAID 2008; World Bank 2009a) .
Land price data have not been published in Pakistan since 1947. However, several micro-level studies (Renkow 1993; Hirashima 1978 ) find evidence of a decline-particularly during the Green Revolution period of 1976-1989-in the rent-price ratio, which would naturally reduce land purchases. 10 In summary, the laws governing the ownership and exchange of land in Pakistan are a morass of colonial and customary laws that provide a weak legal and judicial framework. Thus, it is not surprising that landownership is rarely registered, that landownership transfers often occur informally, that disputes taken to the courts can take years to resolve (USAID 2010; Ali and Nasir 2010) , or that the amount of registered land nationwide remains unreported (USAID 2010). Nor is it surprising that land is at the heart of politics in Pakistan.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our empirical analysis aims to uncover the impacts of political competition on land in rural Pakistan. We hypothesize that more intense competition increases land values and land rental. We do so by estimating the following fixed effects model:
where an observation is a plot of land indexed by i, j indexes the provincial assembly constituency (a political boundary) in which the plot lies, and k indexes the district in which the plot lies. α k are district fixed effects. Y i is one of several outcome variables. The three principal outcomes we consider are the logged land value of plot i (estimated by the head of the household cultivating the plot), a dummy for a landowning household renting out some of their land, and the share of owned land that is rented out. In companion analyses, Y i is one of several village-level variables capturing the institutional and governance environment and the set of available amenities and public investments. P j is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of political concentration in provincial assembly constituency j during the 2008 PA elections. For each provincial assembly constituency, the index is constructed by summing the squared vote shares (s c ) of all candidates (c 1 , . . . , c n ) in the constituency that competed in the PA elections:
Since s c ∈ [0, 1]∀c, P j ∈ [0, 1]. A higher value of P j indicates greater political concentration, and thus less political competition. P j = 1 only when a single candidate wins all votes cast, and adding an additional candidate who won votes would lower the value of P j . Additionally, in two provincial assembly constituencies with the same number of candidates winning votes, the constituency with the closest to an "even" split of the votes (50 percent each in the case of two candidates, 33.3 percent each in the case of three candidates, 25 percent each in the case of four candidates) would have the lowest value of P j .
X i is a vector of characteristics from a 2012 household survey describing plot i, the household that farms the plot, and the village in which it is located. Six sets of controls are entered sequentially: geographic, plot-level, weather, household socioeconomic, household wealth and consumption variables, and distances to major cities (distance in kilometers to a city of 20,000 or more and to a city of 100,000 or more). These variables are detailed in the next section. District fixed effects control for the unique institutional, geographic, and social features of each district. These include provincial and district policies, institutions, and the level of public goods and services provision; district-level variation in soil quality, fertility, and weather patterns; and socioeconomic and cultural differences between districts.
Data and Data Sources
Our primary data sources are Rounds 1 and 1.5 of the Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey (RHPS), carried out in 2012 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with Innovative Development Strategies. The Round 1 survey, conducted in March-April 2012, covered 2,090 rural households across 76 rural villages in Punjab, Sindh, and KPK provinces using a multistage stratified random sampling approach. 11 The sampling frame excludes the province of Balochistan, the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas, and 13 of KPK's 24 districts because they were all considered unsafe for enumeration.
Of the 2,090 households covered in Round 1, a total of 980 households (47 percent) reported that they were directly engaged in the cultivation of at least one plot of land that was owned, rented, or cropshared. These households-situated in 75 of the 76 villages that were initially surveyed-were interviewed again in Round 1.5 in October-November 2012. Note, however, that in the time that elapsed between Round 1 and Round 1.5, 38 households (4 percent) of the households that were cultivating owned, rented, or cropshared land in Round 1 were not doing so when the Round 1.5 interviews were conducted, thus reducing the subsample to 942 households. Round 1.5 includes data on household demographics, assets, education, consumption, income, employment, credit, and plot characteristics. 12 Plot-level information included plot sizes, soil conditions, locations on the watercourse (canal), access to a tubewell or pump, perceived plot values, and tenancy status (owned, rented in, owned but rented out, crop sharing in, or owned but crop sharing out).
Data from both rounds were combined with information on village characteristics captured through a community questionnaire conducted during Round 1. The community questionnaire is based on responses from three-member focus groups of village leaders and other knowledgeable individuals and provides information on the infrastructural, governance, institutional, and business environment of each village.
For our analysis, we construct two datasets. The first is a plot-level dataset which includes all plots owned, rented, or cropshared by the 942 land-cultivating households surveyed in Round 1.5. This dataset includes 1,659 plots and is used to analyze the impact of political competition on land values. The second is a household-level dataset, comprising the 746 land-cultivating households in Round 1.5 that own at least one plot. This sample is used to analyze the impact of political competition on landowners' use of land rental and crop sharing arrangements.
Control variables include geography variables (longitude, latitude, longitude × latitude, household elevation, farming systems/agroecological zones, and distances to major cities) that capture the suitability of the land with respect to agricultural production or other geographic determinants of land value; plot characteristics (area, soil type, soil fertility, erosion level, slope type, waterlogging, and salinity) to capture more site-specific determinants of land value), and weather variables (average rainfall and average temperature in the village in which the plot is located, and their coefficients of variation-by season-during the period 13 to capture climatic conditions that affect land values. Plot characteristics are summarized in Table 3 .1, weather variables are summarized in Appendix Table A .4, and all other controls are summarized in Table 3 .2. The average plot is 3.3 acres, is located 1.4 kilometers from the home, and is within the village. It has clay loam soil of moderate fertility, is flat, and is not experiencing problems of erosion, waterlogging, or salinity. The plot is not irrigated, and there is no tubewell or pump located on the plot.
The rainfall and temperature data come from NASA-POWER (National Aeronautics and Space Administration Prediction of Worldwide Energy Resource) satellite data, obtained from the NASA Langley Research Center POWER Project. We first computed the centroid of all households in a village using household GPS (global positioning system) coordinates. We then found the rainfall and temperature for this village centroid for each month during 1981-2012 (the full period for which data are available) and constructed the weather variables described above. Data on NA and PA election results were provided by the Election Commission of Pakistan, 14 and used to calculate measures of political competition in all constituencies.
12 Our analysis relies on data reported by the household head. Less than 2 percent of households were female-headed. 13 We consider three seasons: Rabi (October-March), Kharif (April-June), and Monsoon (July-September). 14 Tabulated election data, provided by PakTribune-a Pakistani news service-are available at http://elections.com.pk. Source: Authors using Round 1.5, plot-level data and Round 1.5 household-level data (last two rows)(2012). Note: Rs = rupees.
Note that the plot-level control variables described earlier cannot, by construction, be used in the household-level estimations. Instead, we use three land controls in these household-level estimations: total acres owned, total acres owned squared, and a dummy for the household having at least one plot located on the watercourse (canal). The household-level control variables include both household socioeconomic variables (education level of the household head, 15 ethnicity of the household head, household size, and tenure status) and household wealth and consumption variables. On average, the households in our sample are headed by an uneducated male who is most likely to grow cotton and wheat on the plot. Among land-owning households, an average of six percent rent out some portion of their land, and the average share of owned land that is rented out (across all landowners) is three percent. Of those households in our sample that rent out, 79 percent do so through fixed-rent arrangements while 21 percent do so through crop sharing arrangements.
Identification and Instruments for Political Competition
The main threat to identification of a causal relationship between political competition and our outcome variables is the existence of unobserved covariates that are correlated with both political competition and land values or rental. This could arise for several reasons. First, areas with high land values or more active land rental markets may be pleasant places to live that are proximate to urban centers and have many amenities. However, these features may encourage candidates to locate there and compete in political races. Second, areas with low land values may be populated with many poor people whose political support is accordingly relatively cheap to earn. However, this may introduce more political competition since winning an election in such an area may be a relatively cheaper way to earn a provincial assembly seat. Third, areas with high land values and active land rental markets may be places with ample rent-seeking opportunities for politicians. However, this is likely to attract a great deal of political competition as the rewards of being in office will be accordingly higher. Fourth, places with insecure property rights might have lower land values because this insecurity tends to lower economic growth and investment (North 1981; DeLong and Shleifer 1992) . Conversely, farmers may endogenously respond to insecure property rights by making investments that enhance and secure their claims (Besley 1995) . 15 Head education dummies include: uneducated (base group), grade 1 to primary, and higher than primary.
However, such contested claims could open up opportunities for political competition for resources. The possibility of reverse causality is also a concern. An area with high land values and good governance is likely to attract lots of candidates to fight for its PA seat. Any of these possibilities would cause endogeneity problems that would bias ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of β 1 in Equation (1).
To address such threats to identification, we construct a simulated instrumental variable that captures plausibly exogenous variation in the level of political concentration, P j in PA constituency j in 2008. The idea behind the instrument is as follows: All candidates in a PA constituency run either under a political party (with a maximum of one candidate per party) or as independents, and only one of them is chosen to represent the PA constituency. Their chances of election will be helped or harmed by how popular their party is on a national scale (or by how popular independent candidates are, on average, in the case of an independent). We thus exploit information on this national popularity as an exogenous shock to the share of votes received by a given candidate in a PA constituency political race. Table 3 .3 shows the number of votes cast for each party competing in the 2008 National Assembly elections, as well as the number of votes cast for independent candidates (column 1). Column 2 shows the share of votes that this represents. Columns 3-6 show the share of votes received by each of these parties in each of Pakistan's four main provinces. From this table, it is fairly obvious that parties popular in one province are often not as popular in another province, and even the most popular parties do not compete in all constituencies. This type of heterogeneity is even more striking if one examines voting results at the NA constituency level (not shown). Pakistan's three most popular parties on the national scale fared very differently across different NA constituencies. In particular, the vote shares of the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) ranged from 0 to 100.0 percent, and those of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) ranged from 0 to 82.4 percent.
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The instrumental variable we construct, N j , is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of simulated (that is, predicted) political concentration in PA constituency j in 2008. Just as for P j , the index is a sum of squared vote shares. However, these vote shares are computed somewhat differently. Instead of looking at the number of votes actually won by each competing candidate in the PA constituency, we look at the number of votes won by the candidate's party across all NA constituencies in the country other than the NA constituency in which PA constituency j is located. This captures the national popularity of that party (specifically, that part of its national popularity not influenced by its local popularity). In this way, we use NA, national aggregate data to assign a vote total to each party competing in PA constituency j. 16 Given these vote totals, we compute the share of votes earned that this implies for each party competing in the PA constituency. The instrument is then the sum of the squared vote shares, s r of all parties (r 1 , . . . , r n ) in the constituency that competed in the PA elections:
The average political concentration index (P j ) among the sampled PA constituencies is 0.41, with a standard deviation of 0.11, whereas the average simulated political concentration index (N j ) is 0.33, with a standard deviation of 0.08. Table 3 .4 summarizes the range of possible values of the political concentration index. In Panels A and B, respectively, we show the minimum and maximum possible index value, given a set number of candidates competing and a set share of the vote earned by one of the candidates. With N candidates competing and one of them earning X percent of the vote, one would minimize political concentration by assigning (1 − X)/(N − 1) percent of the vote to each of the N -1 remaining candidates. One would maximize political concentration by assigning (1 − X) percent of the vote to the second candidate and 0 percent to each additional candidate. Comparing Panels A and B in Table 3 .4, we can see, for example, that when 10 candidates compete and one of them wins 10 percent of the vote, the index could be anywhere between 0.10 (if the other 9 candidates each earn 10 percent of the vote) and 0.82 (if another candidate earns 90 percent of the vote and the other 8 earn 0 percent).
The results from Table 3 .4 are intuitive; with more candidates competing, the range of possible political concentration index values is greater. The additional candidates can earn almost none of the vote, and therefore introduce almost no political competition into the electoral race (leading to a very high HHI), or they can generate a very close political race (leading to a very low HHI). Furthermore, for a given number of competing candidates, the HHI is minimized when the split of votes is as even as possible. For two candidates, this is a 50-50 race; as we see from the corresponding row of Panel A, the political concentration index is minimized at 0.5 when each candidate has half of the votes. For three candidates, this is a 33.3-33.3-33 .3 race; as we see from the corresponding row of Panel A, the political concentration index is minimized at 0.34 when this split is even.
In the next section, we show that simulated political concentration, N j , satisfies the inclusion restriction: it is a strong predictor of actual political concentration, P j . For the instrument to be valid, the exclusion restriction requires that simulated political concentration only affects rural outcomes (our main outcomes being land values and the propensity to rent out land) by affecting the actual degree of political concentration. It cannot be the case that simulated political concentration has a direct effect on rural outcomes, or that it has an effect running through omitted variables that themselves affect rural outcomes. As the simulated instrument uses data on the national popularity of each party (which is exogenous to the party's popularity in the local PA constituency), we argue that the exclusion restriction is satisfied. 
EFFECT OF POLITICAL COMPETITION ON LAND VALUES AND RENTAL

OLS Results
These findings are significant at the 1 percent level. In the baseline specification of column 7, which includes the full set of controls, a standard deviation decrease in political concentration raises land values by 16 percent. 17 The results suggest a robust and positive relationship between political competition and rural land values (β 1 < 0).
That the coefficient on political concentration varies little when we add controls suggests that omitted variables alone do not drive the results. Following Bellows and Miguel (2009), we use the change in the coefficient on political concentration following the addition of controls to estimate the relative importance of the omitted variables required to explain the entire effect of political concentration. Comparing specifications 1 and 7 in Table 4 .1, we find that selection on unobservables would have to be 5.9 times greater than selection on our observable controls to itself account for the entire effect of political concentration.18 The addition of other controls is thus unlikely to eliminate the relationship between political concentration and rural land values. The signs on the control variables are generally intuitive. Both severe soil erosion and salinity significantly lower land values. nonirrigated land is worth less than irrigated land, and among irrigated plots, it is better to have a plot at the head of the watercourse than in the middle, and better in the middle than at the tail. Plots near a city of 20,000 or more population are worth more than those that are not. Finally, experiencing waterlogging, being located on more rugged terrain (as evidenced by the standard deviation of elevation in the village), having a tubewell or pump on the plot, and being closer to a city of 100,000 population or higher do not significantly affect rural land values in the presence of the other controls. Table 4 .2 presents OLS estimates of the effect of political competition on two measures of landowners' use of land rental arrangements: (1) a dummy for the household renting out land (Panel A) and (2) the share of owned land that is rented out (Panel B). All of these regressions are carried out at the household level, and include only those land-cultivating households that own land (and could thus make the decisions to rent out that land). For both measures, we find that greater political competition (a lower value on the political concentration index) significantly increases land rental (β 1 < 0). Once again, all specifications include district fixed effects, and other controls are introduced sequentially in columns 2-7.
Panel A shows that a standard deviation decrease in political concentration (0.11 units) is associated with a 4-5 percentage point increase in the probability of renting out land. This is a sizeable, 61-94 percent increase over the mean rate (about 6 percent of landowners rent out land, on average). Panel B shows that political competition is not only associated with more rental arrangements, but also with a greater share of total owned land being rented or cropshared. A standard deviation decrease in political concentration is associated with an additional 2-3 percentage points of the average landowner's land being rented out. These findings suggest a robust and positive relationship between political competition and renting land. In the baseline specifications of column 7, with the full set of controls, a standard deviation decrease in political concentration is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the probability of renting or crop sharing and a 3 percentage point increase in the share of land rented out.
Comparing specifications 1 and 7 in Table 4 .2, Panel A, we find that selection on unobservables would have to be 2.9 times greater than selection on observables to itself account for the entire effect of political concentration of the prevalence of land rental arrangements. 19 In Panel B, we find a similar ratio. The addition of other controls is thus unlikely to eliminate the relationship between political concentration and land rental arrangements. Source: Authors. Note: OLS = ordinary least squares; HH = household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the plot level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 4 .3 presents estimates from the first-stage regression using the plot-level dataset. All specifications include district fixed effects. Simulated political concentration is robustly positively correlated with observed political competition in all specifications. The baseline specification in column 6, which includes the full set of controls, indicates that a 1.0 unit increase in simulated political concentration raises observed political concentration by 0.62. The F statistic on the excluded instrument is 352, indicating that this is a robustly strong predictor of political concentration and there is no problem of weak instruments. The national popularity of the parties competing in a given PA constituency strongly predicts the success of those parties at the PA constituency level and thus helps predict the resulting level of political concentration. Source: Authors. Note: IV = instrumental variables; HH = household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the plot level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 4 .4 presents estimates from the first-stage regression using the household-level dataset. Once again, simulated political concentration is robustly positively correlated with observed political concentration in all specifications. The baseline specification in column 6, which includes the full set of controls, indicates that a 1.0 unit increase in simulated political concentration raises observed political concentration by 0.63. Source: Authors. Note: IV = instrumental variables; HH = household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the plot level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively.
IV First Stage Results
The F statistic on the excluded instrument is 226-still very high and indicating no problem of weak instruments. Together, these results indicate that simulated political competition satisfied the inclusion restriction whether we use a plot-level or a household-level dataset. Table 4 .5 presents IV estimates of the effects of political competition on land values; columns 1-6 correspond with the OLS estimates in columns 2-7 of Table 4 .2. The IV results similarly suggest that political competition significantly raises rural land values. In the baseline specification with the full set of controls (column 6), a standard deviation decrease in political concentration (0.11 units) leads to a 36 percent increase in rural land values. This finding is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and suggests a large impact. The OLS point estimate is just outside the 95 percent confidence interval around this estimate, indicating that the IV estimate is statistically distinguishable from the OLS estimate at the 95 percent level of confidence (though it is not significantly different at the 99 percent confidence level). Source: Authors. Note: IV = instrumental variables; HH = household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the plot level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 4 .6 presents IV estimates of the effects of political competition on use of rental arrangements that correspond with the OLS estimates of Table 4 .3. From the baseline specification of column 6 (with the full set of controls), a standard deviation decrease in political concentration leads, on average, to an 8 percentage point increase in the share of landowners renting out land (a more than doubling of the average rate) and an additional 4 percentage points of each landowner's land being rented out. Each of the corresponding OLS point estimates are within the 95 percent confidence interval around these IV estimates, making the IV estimates statistically indistinguishable from the OLS estimates at the 95 percent level of confidence. Source: Authors. Note: IV = instrumental variables; HH = household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the plot level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively.
IV Second Stage Results
Results by Household Poverty Level
To better understand the heterogeneous impacts of political competition, we separately examined the effects estimated above on relatively poor households and less-poor households. To do so, we segmented plots into poverty categories in two ways. First, we looked at the per capita expenditure of the household that manages the plot, and divided plots into those managed by households in the bottom and the top half of per capita household expenditure. Second, we looked at the total wealth of the household that manages the plot, and divided plots into those in the bottom and top half of wealth. For both the consumption and wealth definitions of poverty, we refer to the bottom half as the poorest half and the top half as the least poor half. One might expect political competition to disproportionately raise the land values of poorer households, since they typically have less access to channels of patronage and therefore reap fewer benefits in political settings controlled by a few dominating elites. We investigate this hypothesis in Table 4 .7. Table 4 .7 presents OLS and IV estimates of the impact of political concentration on land values by poverty level. Columns 1 and 2 consider plots managed by the poorest half of households, while columns 3 and 4 consider plots managed by the least poor half of households. We estimate a model that includes all but socioeconomic, expenditure, and wealth controls (columns 1 and 3) and a model that includes the full set of controls (columns 2 and 4). Source: Authors. Note: OLS = ordinary least squares; IV = instrumental variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the plot level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively. Panels A and B present OLS and IV results, respectively, using the per capita expenditure measure of poverty. From columns 2 and 4 of Panel A, we see that a standard deviation decrease in political concentration raises land values by 18 percent for the poorest half, but by only 12 percent for the least poor half (both effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level). Panel B presents the corresponding IV results. Here, the difference between the effect of political competition on the poor and that on the less poor in columns 2 and 4 is even more dramatic; a standard deviation increase in political competition raises land values by 79 percent for the poorest half (significant at the 1 percent level) but does not have a statistically significant impact on the land values of the least poor households. Panels C and D present OLS and IV results, respectively, using the total household wealth measure of poverty. From columns 2 and 4 of Panel C, a standard deviation decrease in political concentration raises land values by 19 percent for the poorest half (significant at the 5 percent level), but has no economically or statistically significant impact on the least poor. Panel D presents the corresponding IV results, showing that a standard deviation increase in political competition raises land values by 52 percent for the poorest half, but by only 28 percent for the least poor half (both effects are significant at the 1 percent level).
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Combined, these results suggest that it is the poorest half of households that see the largest increase in land values as a result of greater political competition in their PA constituency. Higher land values are likely to especially benefit those who own land; renters may see higher land rental prices as a result, so may not benefit. Table 4 .8 presents OLS and IV results showing how political competition affects households' propensity to engage in rental arrangements. As in the plot-level analysis, we define poverty by both a per capita expenditure and a household wealth measure. In contrast to the land values regressions, it is apparent that it is the least poor half of households that is most affected by political competition. A standard deviation decrease in political concentration is associated with between an 8 (OLS results, Panel A) and 13 (IV results, Panel B) percentage point increase in the likelihood that a landowner in the top half of per capita consumption rents out land. However, political competition has no statistically significant effect on the propensity to rent out land for landowners in the bottom half of per capita consumption. We find similar results when defining poverty by wealth (Panels C and D). It may be the case that poorer land owners need all of their land to subsist, and their behavior is therefore unaffected by political competition. Richer land owners, on the other hand, may have excess land and make rental decisions based on the political and institutional environment. OLS = ordinary least squares; IV = instrumental variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are at the household level and include district-level fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively. Note that poorest half and least poor half sample sizes do not match because all households are divided into the poorest and least poor halves, but these regressions include only land-owning households.
A standard deviation decrease in political concentration is also associated with between a 4 (OLS results, Panel A) and 6 (IV results, Panel B) percentage point increase in the share of owned land that is rented out by landowners in the top half of per capita consumption. However, again political competition has no statistically significant impact on the share of land rented out by landowners in the bottom half of per capita consumption. Once again, the results are substantially unchanged when we instead measure poverty using the household wealth measure (Panels C and D). It seems that poor, landowning households fail to rent out land because they are actively using it-a need that is invariant to the level of political competition. On the contrary, the level of political competition may-through a number of institutional and public expenditure mechanisms explored in the next section-affect the decisions of less poor households, who may not need to farm all of their land.
POTENTIAL CAUSAL CHANNELS
Earlier, we reviewed three strands of literature suggesting mechanisms through which political competition raises rural land values and increases land rental. First, competition may lead to better laws, institutions, and governance. Second, political competition may lead to more efficient and higher investments in publicly provided goods, and better communal amenities more generally. Third, political competition may affect the security situation in a village. In this section, we explore these potential causal channels by examining how political competition affects a number of outcome variables capturing both the institutional environment and public investment and village amenities.
To capture laws, institutions, and governance as they apply in a rural setting, we use nine variables, summarized in Table 5 .1. Five variables were derived from the RHPS household survey: the household head's perceived access to justice, 20 a dummy for the head's perception that they could sell the land they own at a fair price if they wanted to (73 percent of landowners felt they could), a dummy for the head's perception that they could sell their livestock at a fair price if desired to do so (70 percent of livestock owners felt they could), a dummy for most landowners having a legal document for at least some type of property, and a dummy for the presence of organized meetings of village residents to discuss village issues and events. The remaining four variables were derived from the RHPS community survey and pertain specifically to focus group respondents' perceptions of major constraint on businesses: it is expensive or tedious to register or license a business; heavy government regulation of land or labor; heavy government regulation of prices or agricultural production; and poor access to markets or market information.
To capture government investments and community amenities which government policies may impact, we use 10 variables also derived from the RHPS community survey and summarized in Table 5 .1: dummies for the village having an electricity connection, a natural gas supply, a sewage system, mud roads as the most common village road surface, and public transport available to the nearest city; the distance in kilometers to the nearest clinic or dispensary; a dummy for having received information on crop or livestock production within the past year from a source other than an extension agent; a dummy for any household member having met with an extension agent within the past year; and dummies for the village having had the Watan Card flood relief program in the village by 2010 (a year of major flooding) and having citizens benefiting from the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) by 2010. 21 20 The exact questions used asked respondents if they strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), or strongly agree (4) with a given statement. These statements are: 1) The laws and law enforcement in my community generally prevent crime; 2) If someone commits a crime against me, members of my community will be able to help me; 3) If someone commits a crime against me, the police will be able to help me; 4) If someone commits a crime against me, I can get justice through the courts system; 5) In the end, victims of crime usually see justice done; 6) I can get justice through the courts if someone tries to take my land; 7) A land title means that I can get justice through the courts if someone tries to take away my land; and 8) Being harassed by the police is a problem for young men in my community. Questions for which 1 indicates a high sense of access to justice were reverse-coded so that high scores on each of the eight components always indicate greater sense of access to justice. These eight scores where then individually normalized, and the eight were then averaged. Table 5 .2 presents IV results showing the effect of political concentration on each of the nine institutions and governance outcomes (Panel A) and 10 amenities and public-sector investment outcomes (Panel B) . From Panel A, we see that greater political concentration leads to a decreased sense of access to justice, a lower perceived ability to sell land (though a higher prevalence of legal documents for land), and more governance-related constraints on business. Column 1 shows that a standard deviation decrease in political concentration leads to a (−0.11 × −1.14) = 0.12 unit increase in perceived access to justice, which is a 0.24 standard deviation increase. Column 2 shows that the same decrease in political competition makes households 10 percentage points (−0.11 × 0.93 = 0.10) more likely to feel that they could sell owned land at a fair price if they wanted to. A similar effect is not found for the perceived ability to sell livestock (column 3). This easier perceived ability to sell land comes despite the fact that households become 3 percentage points less likely to live in a village where most people have legal documents for some type of land (column 4)-a modest, 3.5 percent decrease from the mean.
There appears to be no impact of political concentration on the prevalence of village meetings to discuss village issues and events (column 5). However, there is a large impact of political competition on perceptions that the government places constraints on businesses. Although there is not a significant effect of political concentration on the perception that the expense and tedium of registering or licensing a business is a constraint on business (column 6), political concentration seems to have many other effects on the business climate. A standard deviation decrease in political concentration leads to a 9 percentage point decrease in the perception that government regulation of land or labor is a constraint (column 7), a 6 percentage point decrease in the perception that government regulation of prices or agricultural production is a constraint (column 8), and a 47 percentage point decrease in the perception that poor access to markets or market information is a constraint (column 9). Combined, these findings suggest that the institutional and governance environment-and what they imply for the business climate-may be one important mechanism through which political competition raises rural land values. Table 5 .2, Panel B, shows that greater political concentration leads to less access to amenities, extensions services, and social protection. A standard deviation decrease in political concentration leads to an 8 percentage point increase in village electrification (column 1), a 12 percentage point increase in village access to natural gas (column 2), though no impact on access to a sewage system (column 3). The village becomes 16 percentage points less likely to have mud as its main road surface (column 4), is 12 percentage points more likely to have public transportation available to the nearest city (Column 5), and has a health clinic or dispensary that is 1.5 kilometers closer to the village (column 6). Citizens in the village are 10 percentage points more likely to have received information on crop or livestock production within the past year from a source other than an extension agent (column 7), and 9 percentage points more likely to have been visited by an extension agent (column 8). The village is also 39 percentage points more likely to have the Watan Card program in place in 2010 (column 9), though no more likely to have citizens benefiting from the BISP by 2010 (column 10). These findings suggest that greater provision of productivity-enhancing public investments and amenities may be another important mechanism through which political competition raises rural land values. Dummy -Village has a natural gas supply Dummy -Village has a sewage system Dummy -The most common surface of village roads is mud Dummy -Public transport available to nearest city Distance to nearest clinic/dispensary (km) Dummy -Received information on crop or livestock production within the past -0.939*** (0.300) 1,390 0.177 Source: Authors. Note: IV = instrumental variable; HH = household. Each column comes from a separate regression of the specified dependent variable on the political concentration index (ranging from 0 to 1) and our full set of controls and district fixed effects. Unless otherwise indicated, all dependent variables come from Round 1 of the Pakistan RHPS survey; where not otherwise specified, the data are from the community-level survey, completed by a three-person focus group. The excluded instrument is simulated political competition. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively.
Finally, we examine the effects of political competition on the security environment. On the one hand, political competition can promote more peaceful interactions and reduce conflict. On the other hand, political concentration may undermine the power of local strongmen who may be integral to security in more institutionally fragile settings, or may create incentives for politicians to strategically instigate violence. Table 5 .3 examines the impact of political competition on measures of how secure land cultivators feel. The results paint a mixed picture, and for many measures of security, political competition has no significant impact. Each column comes from a separate regression of the specified dependent variable on the political concentration index (ranging from 0 to 1) and our full set of controls and district fixed effects. Unless otherwise indicated, all dependent variables come from Round 1 of the Pakistan RHPS survey. The excluded instrument is simulated political competition. Coefficient estimates are significant at the * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent levels, respectively.
First, political competition seems to enhance perceived personal security in several ways. A standard deviation decrease in political concentration (0.11 units) is associated with a 14 percentage point increase in the probability that an individual rates their security level as 6 or higher on a scale from 1 to 10-a 26 percent increase over the mean rate. It also leads to a 9 percentage point decline in feeling that harassment is a problem, a 10 percentage point decline in the feeling that theft is a problem, and a 12 percentage point decline in the feeling that assault is a problem. However, political competition has no impact on whether the individual feels that locks are necessary to keep one's house and belongings safe from theft while they are away, and it also does not make the individual more likely to feel safe going outside their house alone.
Second, political competition appears to have little impact on faith in the criminal justice system. With greater political competition, an individual is no more likely to feel that laws and law enforcement prevent crime, and no more likely to feel that the police or the courts will help them if someone commits a crime against them. We also find no evidence that greater political competition helps with land disputes; individuals are no more likely to feel that they can get justice through the courts if someone tries to take their land. However, we do find some evidence that an increase in political competition decreases perceptions that justice will be done in some way; a standard deviation decrease in political concentration is associated with a 10 percentage point decrease in the perception that in the end, victims of crime usually see justice done (significant at the 10 percent level). This may reflect that political concentration instills faith in more informal justice systems (beyond laws, police, and formal courts). We also find some evidence that these perceptions may harm the business climate; a standard deviation decrease in political concentration is associated with a 21 percentage point increase in the perception that too much crime, theft, and social disorder are a constraint on business (significant at the 1 percent level).
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we combine data from Pakistan's 2008 elections with data from 2012 Pakistan RHPS household surveys to show that PA constituencies in rural Pakistan with greater political competition have significantly higher land values and more active land rental markets. In demonstrating this, we take care to address the underlying issues of endogeneity that would otherwise threaten the causal relationships we explore in this analysis. We find that PA constituencies in rural Pakistan with greater political competition have significantly higher land values. A standard deviation decrease in a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of political concentration in one's provincial assembly constituency leads to a 36 percent increase in land values. Such a decrease in the HHI could be due, for example, to moving from a situation of two candidates winning 27 percent and 73 percent of the vote to a situation of each winning 50 percent. Importantly, land values appear to increase most among poor households, suggesting that the benefits of political competition for land values are greatest for those with the fewest resources to influence policy.
Beyond land values, we also find that a standard deviation decrease in political concentration leads to an 8 percentage point increase in the share of landowners renting or share-cropping out land (a more than doubling of the average rate) and an additional 4 percentage points of each landowner's land being rented or cropshared out. Increases in renting and crop sharing are greatest for the least poor landowners, suggesting that they are the ones for whom the level of political competition is marginal to their renting and crop sharing decisions. Exploring potential causal mechanisms, we show that political competition leads to a more stable and business-friendly governance and institutional environment and better amenities and provision of publicly provided goods. The effect of political competition on security is more ambiguous, suggesting that security may decrease along some dimensions while increasing along others.
The findings presented above have potentially important implications for the governance of land and land tenure in Pakistan. First, our findings suggest that open, transparent, and competitive political competition can support Pakistan's economic goals of growth and poverty reduction. Second, our findings suggest that political competition is especially beneficial to the land-owning rural poor. Third, our findings suggest that while political competition may have an ambiguous effect on security-a major challenge for Pakistan that cuts across PA constituencies, NA constituencies, districts, and provinces alike-political competition does lead to improvements in publicly provided goods and services, and the governance environment more broadly. With the devolution of many federal powers to the provinces under the Eighteenth Amendment in 2010, PA members will likely have increasingly greater access to decisionmaking power over the allocation of public resources to development projects in their constituencies. With greater access to public resources, higher expectations of transparency and accountability among PAs may follow from the very constituents who voted them into power. And where such expectations are unmet, it is possible that political competition may ensue. This cycle of competition may, in the end, be a virtuous one for Pakistan's democracy if PAs are able to muster the requisite governance and managerial capacity to fulfill their electorates' expectations and address provincial development challenges. 
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